Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts

Saturday, March 29, 2008

medical assistance - letter to my state reps

I sent the following letter to my state reps on Thursday:

Gentlemen:

I am a constituent, living in Sheboygan. My husband and I are both currently unemployed, uninsured, childless, and going through a tough financial situation. I don't particularly want a hand-out - what I want is a job, but I haven't been able to find one - but I am an insulin-dependent diabetic who cannot afford her insulin (if I were taking the shots as prescribed, it would cost $190 a month for the insulin itself, plus approximately $65 a month more for the required supplies (syringes, lancets,
test strips)).

Thus, I was dismayed to learn that, in Wisconsin, one must have a child to qualify for medical assistance of any kind, if one is not completely disabled from working. Clearly, my choices, if I need help with the costs attendant to obtaining my insulin, are (1) get pregnant (not a good choice, considering that we cannot afford a child, plus the uncontrolled diabetes and the fact that I'm 39 mean that any pregnancy would be risky), or (2) go without (which is what I have been doing), and/or (3) wait until
my diabetes actually becomes disabling (which may not be far off), at which point, I might qualify, but would no longer be able to work. Do these sound like good choices to you?

I tried to qualify for Lilly's discount insulin program, but it is based on the prior year's tax returns, and, since I made $45,000 last year before losing my job, I made too much, and cannot qualify. It does not matter that I have no money at all, now.

Perhaps the legislature should think about putting into place some way for persons who are not completely disabled, and do not have children, to obtain at least limited medical assistance for chronic and potentially disabling conditions. I would hope that this would be a measure that anyone, of any party, could get behind. Thus, I hope that I can count on both of you to introduce appropriate legislation to make such assistance a reality - and soon.

Thank you for your time and your anticipated cooperation.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yesterday, I got a call from one of the reps' staffers. They will be introducing legislation next week. They agreed that it makes much more sense for the state to temporarily cover the medication costs of someone who is able to work, than to force that person to become disabled and then have the state have to pay their medical bills for the rest of their lives. The staffer is also going to try to find other avenues of assistance for me that I might have missed in my own search for help.

Of course, there's no guarantee that the measure will pass, or that it would become effective soon enough to actually help me; but if it does pass, it'll help a lot of people - I can't be the only person with a chronic, potentially disabling, but completely treatable, condition who can't afford their medication.

Who says it does no good to contact your representatives?

a. ;)

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

I do not now, nor have I ever, had any problem with either: (1) the United States having interests overseas or (2) going overseas to defend/protect those interests.

What I *do* have a problem with is the hypocritical half-truths that are used to mask the real reasons we go in, when we *do* go overseas to defend/protect those interests.

For example: the public was "sold" on going in to Somalia because we were supposedly going in for "humanitarian" purposes...those nasty warlords were being so mean to the people, and whatnot. What a bunch of hooey. We went in to Somalia because British Petroleum and Amoco own the vast majority of the mineral rights and/or oil production leases in Somalia, and couldn't extract their oil without interference by the nasty warlords' infighting.

I have no problem with going in to protect BP and Amoco, but let's say that's what we're doing. If we were really going to go in somewhere for humanitarian reasons, we should have gone in to the Sudan, where the human rights violations then (and now) were at least 10 times worse than anything going on then in Somalia. But we didn't. Why? Simple: no oil in the Sudan, and even if there were oil there, the topography of the land would make extraction of said oil extremely difficult.

As Gordon Sinclair pointed out in his "One Canadian's View of America", America has gone in to numerous countries to help in the aftermath of disaster. I have no problem with our doing that, either. I do have a problem, however, with our charging those countries (particularly those countries in the Third World) for our help. Aren't we the richest country? Can't we afford to help out countries that aren't as well off? Isn't that how charity is supposed to work? If a country has just sustained a disaster and needs help to rebuild infrastructure afterward, doesn't it stand to reason that they can't afford to pay us back for the help we give? Why don't we just write it off? Put down the expense as part of the cost of maintaining good will?

As for America being the world's watchdog, I think that our role would be much less necessary if the United Nations were in a position to take over that role. But in order for that to happen, we'd have to let the UN take on a lot more responsibility, and we've never, as a country, been willing to do that - perhaps because if we did, we might have to face our own shortcomings. For example, we've still not paid the fines imposed upon us by the International Court of Justice for the mining of Nicaragua's harbors. Let the UN have some teeth. If we're in the wrong, we ought to admit it, and take our knocks like everyone else.

If we stopped being hypocritical and admitted when we make mistakes, the other countries of the world might actually see us in a better light. People elsewhere might very well still hate us for things done in the past, but they might at least have some respect for us going forward.

a.

(Originally written in July 2004)

Friday, January 4, 2008

How to impeach a sitting President

What actually needs to happen to impeach a sitting President, and what happens if proceedings are actually initiated?

First, there has to be an actual crime. The Constitution says that a sitting President can be impeached for "high crimes and misdemeanors". What constitutes a "high crime" isn't exactly clear, but it probably means what are now denominated as "felonies". It needn't be a federal crime, it could be a state crime.

Hence, for example, when President Clinton allegedly lied under oath in a deposition in the Paula Jones' case about his actions with Monica Lewinsky, that would be perjury (had he not been acquitted), that's a crime (in that case, a state crime), and that qualifies.

Taking an unpopular action, or failing to take a popularly demanded action, is not necessarily a crime, unless one is required to act (or fail to act) by law. So, 99.9% of what any sitting President does is not actionable in impeachment proceedings, regardless of whether we do or don't like it.

Next, the House of Representatives has to pass a bill of impeachment. This puts the House in the position of sitting as a sort of Grand Jury, examining the evidence to see if there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the claim, regardless of whatever defenses might be available. Hence, President Clinton was impeached, as was President Johnson (Andrew, not Lyndon), by the House of Representatives. Being impeached does not mean that one is actually guilty (nor does being indicted by a Grand Jury).

If the House passes the bill of impeachment, the case moves to the Senate. The Senate holds a trial, with the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court presiding (normally, the Vice President, acting as President of the Senate, presides over Senate proceedings; this is an exception).

"Presiding", to my understanding, means that the CJ makes evidentiary rulings and governs the proceedings, but as far as I'm aware, the CJ has no vote on the ultimate decision as to whether or not to remove the President from office, nor does the Supreme Court have any jurisdiction to review the Senate's decision.

And, by the way, that's all that happens, should the President be found "guilty" in the Senate trial: he's removed from office. Period. He does not immediately go to prison/jail.

Neither President Clinton nor President Johnson were removed from office by the Senate (Johnson actually escaped that fate by only one vote; for more info on his impeachment and trial, see: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/grant/peopleevents/e_impeach.html).

If a sitting President were to be removed from office by the Senate, it would be up to state or federal officials (depending on what the alleged crime was that had caused the impeachment proceedings) to institute criminal proceedings afterward. A sitting President may not be tried for a crime while in office other than by impeachment proceedings, so if he is to go to jail for the alleged crime, he must be tried again by the judicial branch, after being removed from office in the impeachment proceedings.


a. ;)

Clinton and Perjury

Was President Clinton convicted of perjury?

The answer to that question is: Unequivocally, NO, he was NOT. He was ACCUSED of having committed perjury, in the Articles of Impeachment. He was acquitted of all charges in the Articles in the Senate trial. Period.

However, Judge Susan Webber Wright, the judge in the Paula Jones case, did find Clinton guilty of civil contempt of court (not a crime) for having given a misleading answer in his deposition in that case. Civil contempt, NOT perjury. He was "sanctioned", not "fined". While this may seem to be picking at hairs to the non-legally inclined amongst us, it actually does make for a big difference in the legal system.

From the Court's decision (all emphasis mine):

What began as a civil lawsuit against the President of the United States for alleged sexual harassment eventually resulted in an impeachment trial of the President in the United States Senate on two Articles of Impeachment for his actions during the course of this lawsuit and a related criminal investigation being conducted by the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC"). The civil lawsuit was settled while on appeal from this Court's decision granting summary judgment to defendants and the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment. Those proceedings having concluded, the Court now addresses the issue of contempt on the part of the President first raised in footnote five of the Court's Memorandum and Order of September 1, 1998. See Jones v. Clinton, 12 F. Supp.2d 931, 938 n. 5 (E.D.Ark. 1998). For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby adjudges the President to be in contempt of court for his willful failure to obey this Court's
discovery Orders....

On November 13, 1998, while the impeachment proceedings were taking place in the House of Representatives, the plaintiff reached an out-of court settlement for $850,000.00 and withdrew her appeal of this Court's April 1st decision granting summary judgment to defendants. See Jones v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1998). Thereafter, on February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment....

On two separate occasions, this Court ruled in clear and reasonably specific terms that plaintiff was entitled to information regarding any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame state or federal employees. See December 11, 1997 Order, at 3; Pres. Depo. at 53-55, 66, 78. Notwithstanding these Orders, the record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the President responded to plaintiff's questions by giving false, misleading and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process. The President acknowledged as much in his public admission that he "misled people" because, among other things, the questions posed to him "were being asked in a politically inspired lawsuit, which has since been dismissed." ...

Certainly the President's aggravation with what he considered a "politically inspired lawsuit" may well have been justified, although the Court makes no findings in that regard. Even assuming that to be so, however, his recourse for the filing of an improper claim against him was to move for the imposition of sanctions against plaintiff. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 708-09, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (noting the availability of sanctions for litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment).

The President could, for example, have moved for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 if, as he intimated in his address to the Nation, he was convinced that plaintiff's lawsuit was presented for an improper purpose and included claims "based on `allegations and other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary support' or unlikely to prove well-grounded after reasonable investigation." Id. at 709 n. 42, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), (3)). The President never challenged the legitimacy of plaintiff's lawsuit by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 11, however, and it simply is not acceptable to employ deceptions and falsehoods in an attempt to obstruct the judicial process, understandable as his aggravation with plaintiff's lawsuit may have been. "A lawsuit is not a contest in concealment, and the discovery process was established so that `either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.'" Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham[/i], 403 F.2d 119, 130 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)).

In sum, the record leaves no doubt that the President violated this Court's discovery Orders regarding disclosure of information deemed by this Court to be relevant to plaintiff's lawsuit. The Court therefore adjudges the President to be in civil contempt of court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)....

The Court now turns to the issue of appropriate sanctions. Several of the sanctions contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) are unavailable to this Court as the underlying lawsuit has been terminated. The Court cannot, for example, order that the matters upon which the President gave false statements be taken as established, nor can the Court render a default judgment against the President, both of which the Court would have considered had this Court's grant of summary judgment to defendants been reversed and remanded. Moreover, as the Court earlier noted, the determination of appropriate sanctions must take into account that this case was dismissed on summary judgment as lacking in merit — a decision that would not have changed even had the President been truthful with respect to his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky — and that plaintiff was made whole, having settled this case for an amount in excess of that prayed for in her complaint.

Nevertheless, the President's contumacious conduct in this case, coming as it did from a member of the bar and the chief law enforcement officer of this Nation, was without justification and undermined the integrity of the judicial system. "[O]ur adversary system depends on a most jealous safeguarding of truth and candor," United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 1993), and "[t]he system can provide no harbor for clever devises to divert the search, mislead opposing counsel or the court, or cover up that which is necessary for justice in the end." Id. at 457-58. Sanctions must be imposed, not only to redress the misconduct of the President in this case, but to deter others who, having observed the President's televised address to the Nation in which his defiance of this Court's discovery Orders was revealed, might themselves consider emulating the President of the United States by willfully violating discovery orders of this and other courts, thereby engaging in conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial system. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (noting that "other parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery orders of other district courts" if contumacious conduct was left unaddressed) (per curiam); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (noting that Rule 37 sanctions must be applied diligently, both to penalize those whose conduct warrants sanctions and to deter those who might be tempted to sanctionable conduct in the absence of such a deterrent).

Accordingly, the Court imposes the following sanctions:

First, the President shall pay plaintiff any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders. Plaintiff's former counsel are directed to submit to this Court a detailed statement of any expenses and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this matter within twenty (20) days of the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Second, the President shall reimburse this Court its expenses in traveling to Washington, D.C. at his request to preside over his tainted deposition. The Court therefore will direct that the President deposit into the registry of this Court the sum of $1,202.00, the total expenses incurred by this Court in traveling to Washington, D.C.

In addition, the Court will refer this matter to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct for review and any disciplinary action it deems appropriate for the President's possible violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Relevant to this case, Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to, among other things, "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," or to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." The President's conduct as discussed previously arguably falls within the rubric of Rule 8.4 and involves matters that the Committee on Professional Conduct may deem appropriate for disciplinary action....

Mr. Clinton then entered into a voluntary agreement with the Arkansas Bar, under which his license to practice law in Arkansas was suspended for five years. He is eligible for reinstatement this month (Jan '08).

a. ;)