Showing posts with label legal stuff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label legal stuff. Show all posts

Saturday, March 29, 2008

medical assistance - letter to my state reps

I sent the following letter to my state reps on Thursday:

Gentlemen:

I am a constituent, living in Sheboygan. My husband and I are both currently unemployed, uninsured, childless, and going through a tough financial situation. I don't particularly want a hand-out - what I want is a job, but I haven't been able to find one - but I am an insulin-dependent diabetic who cannot afford her insulin (if I were taking the shots as prescribed, it would cost $190 a month for the insulin itself, plus approximately $65 a month more for the required supplies (syringes, lancets,
test strips)).

Thus, I was dismayed to learn that, in Wisconsin, one must have a child to qualify for medical assistance of any kind, if one is not completely disabled from working. Clearly, my choices, if I need help with the costs attendant to obtaining my insulin, are (1) get pregnant (not a good choice, considering that we cannot afford a child, plus the uncontrolled diabetes and the fact that I'm 39 mean that any pregnancy would be risky), or (2) go without (which is what I have been doing), and/or (3) wait until
my diabetes actually becomes disabling (which may not be far off), at which point, I might qualify, but would no longer be able to work. Do these sound like good choices to you?

I tried to qualify for Lilly's discount insulin program, but it is based on the prior year's tax returns, and, since I made $45,000 last year before losing my job, I made too much, and cannot qualify. It does not matter that I have no money at all, now.

Perhaps the legislature should think about putting into place some way for persons who are not completely disabled, and do not have children, to obtain at least limited medical assistance for chronic and potentially disabling conditions. I would hope that this would be a measure that anyone, of any party, could get behind. Thus, I hope that I can count on both of you to introduce appropriate legislation to make such assistance a reality - and soon.

Thank you for your time and your anticipated cooperation.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yesterday, I got a call from one of the reps' staffers. They will be introducing legislation next week. They agreed that it makes much more sense for the state to temporarily cover the medication costs of someone who is able to work, than to force that person to become disabled and then have the state have to pay their medical bills for the rest of their lives. The staffer is also going to try to find other avenues of assistance for me that I might have missed in my own search for help.

Of course, there's no guarantee that the measure will pass, or that it would become effective soon enough to actually help me; but if it does pass, it'll help a lot of people - I can't be the only person with a chronic, potentially disabling, but completely treatable, condition who can't afford their medication.

Who says it does no good to contact your representatives?

a. ;)

Friday, January 4, 2008

Civil Procedure 101 - Part 3

Continuing series in an effort to live up to the blog's name. Feel free to use any information contained herein at will.

Disclaimer: for informational purposes only; not to be construed as actual legal advice pertaining to any particular situation.

Subpoenas

A subpoena is a written order issued by an attorney to a witness to appear to give testimony, and/or bring documents to trial or produce documents to the attorney issuing the subpoena. If documents are obtained from a non-party witness, the attorney who obtained them typically will produce them to the other parties in the case.

Costs

In a civil matter, the parties bear the cost of their own witnesses and discovery. As a practical matter, this usually means that the attorney (or, on the defense side, the defendant's insurance company) fronts the cost.

For example, in a motor vehicle accident case, the plaintiff (the person who was injured and filed the complaint) is usually represented by an attorney (but not always - you can always represent yourself). The attorney typically fronts the costs of the litigation, and either bills the plaintiff on a monthly or quarterly basis, or takes the costs out of the settlement at the end.

The defendant, on the other hand, will almost always have car insurance. The insurance company will arrange for representation of the defendant as part of his insurance coverage (the defendant can also arrange to have outside counsel, at his own expense). The insurance company is usually billed by the attorney they retain (many insurance defense attorneys are in-house, or work in "captive" law firms, owned by the insurer) for the costs as they go, and usually an insurance defense attorney will get approval of any costs they need to incur, beyond every-day items like photocopies and postage.

Pre-trial and Scheduling Conferences

A pre-trial conference in a civil matter is a meeting of the parties, their attorneys, and the judge. It takes place in the courtroom, and usually the attorneys and the judge work out a trial schedule, and discuss any pre-trial motions (such as motions in limine) that have to be decided before trial can go forward. The parties are usually present in the event that settlement is discussed, so that if the case can be settled, they can agree to the settlement's terms; then the court can approve the settlement, and the case doesn't have to go forward to trial (or can go forward, but with fewer issues to be decided). An attorney always has to have his client's approval of a settlement offer, before the attorney can accept it, so having the client present saves time.

A pre-trial conference differs from a scheduling conference. A scheduling conference happens soon after all parties have filed their initial documents (complaint and answer, etc), and sets certain deadlines and dates for the progress of the case as it goes forward. After the conference, the court usually issues a scheduling order to document those dates. Once that has been done, a scheduling order can be amended, but usually that requires a motion. A pre-trial conference, on the other hand, usually happens about 2-4 weeks before the trial date.

a. ;)

Civil Procedure 101 - Part 2

In my continuing efforts to live up to the name of the blog. Feel free to use the information provided.

Disclaimer: should not be taken as actual legal advice in any particular situation.

Motions

Motions to Dismiss

In addition to the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, there are other motions to dismiss: for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, for failure to implead all necessary parties, etc.

In any motion to dismiss, you assume the allegations in the Complaint are true, and you have to demonstrate that there is some other factor that the plaintiff failed to include that impacts the court's ability to hear the case.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Similar to, but completely different from, a motion to dismiss, the motion for summary judgment can also end the case. Where a motion to dismiss has no impact on the defendant, however, a motion for summary judgment is a "win" for the party that succeeds. A motion for summary judgment can be brought by any party. It is usually not filed until after the Defenadnt has filed an Answer, but can be brought at any time.

In a MfSJ, the party filing the motion (the "moving party") sets out the "undisputed facts" and tries to demonstrate that there are no facts still in dispute that need resolution, the only issues are issues of law. If that is the case, the judge can decide the case, or a specific portion of the case, without a trial by jury.

A MfSJ can be filed seeking resolution of just the defendant's liability, and there can then be a jury trial on the amount of damages (this happens a lot, especially in negligence cases where the fact that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries is clear, but where facts regarding the medical treatment and actual damages are not).

Motions in Limine

Motions in Limine are filed to ask the court to set a limit, usually as to what sort of evidence can and cannot be introduced at trial.

Motion to Intervene

A person who is not a party, but who has an interest in a case that they want resolved or protected by the court, can file a motion to intervene. If granted, they become an intervening plaintiff. An example would be: in an motor vehicle accident case, a medical insurer who pays benefits for the plaintiff's accident-related injuries is entitled to recover the amount paid out if the plaintiff's claim against the defendant is successful; this is called a "subrogation lien". If the subrogated insurer is not named as a party (they're supposed to be, but mistakes happen), they can file a motion to intervene in the case in order to protect their lien.

Those are the most common types of motions. More later!

a. ;)

Civil Procedure 101 - Part 1

In the interests of living up to the name of the blog. Feel free to borrow liberally.

Disclaimer: For informational purposes only. Should not be construed as legal advice for any particular situation.

Complaint

Litigation is started by the filing of the complaint. In most cases, settlement negotiations have preceeded the filing, and the other side is aware that it may be coming, but this is not always true. The Complaint sets out who the parties are, why the court has jurisdiction over the case, what the basic facts are, what rules/laws were violated, and what kind of relief the plaintiff is seeking. The Complaint is accompanied by a Summons, a document which formally orders the defendant to respond within a certain time frame.

Motions

There are a lot of different types of motions. In the beginning of the case, the motion you're most likely to see is a "motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim" (in Federal court, this is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in state courts, the rule numbers vary). In this type of motion, the defendant asserts that even if you assume that everything in the Complaint is true, there is still no claim made upon which the plaintiff can obtain relief from the court.

The example that I've heard most often is kind of silly, but it illustrates the point: Let's say I have a cat that I have named Eliza Doolittle. If I sue you for the wrongful death by murder of Eliza Doolittle, you could file a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, on the grounds that even if you take everything in the Complaint as true, the wrongful death by murder of a cat is not a claim for which the court can give me any sort of relief.

Answer

The Answer to the Complaint usually comes after the motion to dismiss (especially in federal court; in state courts, the motion and answer are sometimes in the same document). In the answer, the defendant responds to the allegations of the complaint, and sets out any affirmative defenses that may be available. For example, if the claim was filed after the deadline set by the statute of limitations, the case can be dismissed, but it's an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant.

Counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims

A defendant may also have related claims that he or she wants to raise as well. If the defendant's claims are against the plaintiff, they're called "counterclaims", and usually involve some sort of set-off (but not always). If one defendant has claims against another defendant, it's called a "cross-claim". This is usually something along the lines of a claim for contribution. If a defendant has a claim that's related to the plaintiff's claim, but it's against a person who is not yet a party to the action, the defendant can file a third-party complaint against the person to bring them in.

Discovery

Despite what you may have seen on television, there are not supposed to be any surprises at trial. In the discovery process, each side is supposed to turn over to the other side the evidence they intend to use at trial. There are certain discovery tools that are used to do this: Requests for Admissions, Depositions, Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Subpoenas. The responses to discovery requests are generally treated as testimony, even though the jury may not get to hear it; for example, interrogatory answers are given under oath, but the jury may never hear the answers read aloud in court.

Affidavits

These are documents in which an individual swears under oath before a notary to certain facts set out in the document. Usually these are attached to a motion.

a. ;)

How to impeach a sitting President

What actually needs to happen to impeach a sitting President, and what happens if proceedings are actually initiated?

First, there has to be an actual crime. The Constitution says that a sitting President can be impeached for "high crimes and misdemeanors". What constitutes a "high crime" isn't exactly clear, but it probably means what are now denominated as "felonies". It needn't be a federal crime, it could be a state crime.

Hence, for example, when President Clinton allegedly lied under oath in a deposition in the Paula Jones' case about his actions with Monica Lewinsky, that would be perjury (had he not been acquitted), that's a crime (in that case, a state crime), and that qualifies.

Taking an unpopular action, or failing to take a popularly demanded action, is not necessarily a crime, unless one is required to act (or fail to act) by law. So, 99.9% of what any sitting President does is not actionable in impeachment proceedings, regardless of whether we do or don't like it.

Next, the House of Representatives has to pass a bill of impeachment. This puts the House in the position of sitting as a sort of Grand Jury, examining the evidence to see if there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the claim, regardless of whatever defenses might be available. Hence, President Clinton was impeached, as was President Johnson (Andrew, not Lyndon), by the House of Representatives. Being impeached does not mean that one is actually guilty (nor does being indicted by a Grand Jury).

If the House passes the bill of impeachment, the case moves to the Senate. The Senate holds a trial, with the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court presiding (normally, the Vice President, acting as President of the Senate, presides over Senate proceedings; this is an exception).

"Presiding", to my understanding, means that the CJ makes evidentiary rulings and governs the proceedings, but as far as I'm aware, the CJ has no vote on the ultimate decision as to whether or not to remove the President from office, nor does the Supreme Court have any jurisdiction to review the Senate's decision.

And, by the way, that's all that happens, should the President be found "guilty" in the Senate trial: he's removed from office. Period. He does not immediately go to prison/jail.

Neither President Clinton nor President Johnson were removed from office by the Senate (Johnson actually escaped that fate by only one vote; for more info on his impeachment and trial, see: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/grant/peopleevents/e_impeach.html).

If a sitting President were to be removed from office by the Senate, it would be up to state or federal officials (depending on what the alleged crime was that had caused the impeachment proceedings) to institute criminal proceedings afterward. A sitting President may not be tried for a crime while in office other than by impeachment proceedings, so if he is to go to jail for the alleged crime, he must be tried again by the judicial branch, after being removed from office in the impeachment proceedings.


a. ;)

Clinton and Perjury

Was President Clinton convicted of perjury?

The answer to that question is: Unequivocally, NO, he was NOT. He was ACCUSED of having committed perjury, in the Articles of Impeachment. He was acquitted of all charges in the Articles in the Senate trial. Period.

However, Judge Susan Webber Wright, the judge in the Paula Jones case, did find Clinton guilty of civil contempt of court (not a crime) for having given a misleading answer in his deposition in that case. Civil contempt, NOT perjury. He was "sanctioned", not "fined". While this may seem to be picking at hairs to the non-legally inclined amongst us, it actually does make for a big difference in the legal system.

From the Court's decision (all emphasis mine):

What began as a civil lawsuit against the President of the United States for alleged sexual harassment eventually resulted in an impeachment trial of the President in the United States Senate on two Articles of Impeachment for his actions during the course of this lawsuit and a related criminal investigation being conducted by the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC"). The civil lawsuit was settled while on appeal from this Court's decision granting summary judgment to defendants and the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment. Those proceedings having concluded, the Court now addresses the issue of contempt on the part of the President first raised in footnote five of the Court's Memorandum and Order of September 1, 1998. See Jones v. Clinton, 12 F. Supp.2d 931, 938 n. 5 (E.D.Ark. 1998). For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby adjudges the President to be in contempt of court for his willful failure to obey this Court's
discovery Orders....

On November 13, 1998, while the impeachment proceedings were taking place in the House of Representatives, the plaintiff reached an out-of court settlement for $850,000.00 and withdrew her appeal of this Court's April 1st decision granting summary judgment to defendants. See Jones v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1998). Thereafter, on February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment....

On two separate occasions, this Court ruled in clear and reasonably specific terms that plaintiff was entitled to information regarding any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame state or federal employees. See December 11, 1997 Order, at 3; Pres. Depo. at 53-55, 66, 78. Notwithstanding these Orders, the record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the President responded to plaintiff's questions by giving false, misleading and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process. The President acknowledged as much in his public admission that he "misled people" because, among other things, the questions posed to him "were being asked in a politically inspired lawsuit, which has since been dismissed." ...

Certainly the President's aggravation with what he considered a "politically inspired lawsuit" may well have been justified, although the Court makes no findings in that regard. Even assuming that to be so, however, his recourse for the filing of an improper claim against him was to move for the imposition of sanctions against plaintiff. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 708-09, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (noting the availability of sanctions for litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment).

The President could, for example, have moved for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 if, as he intimated in his address to the Nation, he was convinced that plaintiff's lawsuit was presented for an improper purpose and included claims "based on `allegations and other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary support' or unlikely to prove well-grounded after reasonable investigation." Id. at 709 n. 42, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), (3)). The President never challenged the legitimacy of plaintiff's lawsuit by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 11, however, and it simply is not acceptable to employ deceptions and falsehoods in an attempt to obstruct the judicial process, understandable as his aggravation with plaintiff's lawsuit may have been. "A lawsuit is not a contest in concealment, and the discovery process was established so that `either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.'" Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham[/i], 403 F.2d 119, 130 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)).

In sum, the record leaves no doubt that the President violated this Court's discovery Orders regarding disclosure of information deemed by this Court to be relevant to plaintiff's lawsuit. The Court therefore adjudges the President to be in civil contempt of court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)....

The Court now turns to the issue of appropriate sanctions. Several of the sanctions contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) are unavailable to this Court as the underlying lawsuit has been terminated. The Court cannot, for example, order that the matters upon which the President gave false statements be taken as established, nor can the Court render a default judgment against the President, both of which the Court would have considered had this Court's grant of summary judgment to defendants been reversed and remanded. Moreover, as the Court earlier noted, the determination of appropriate sanctions must take into account that this case was dismissed on summary judgment as lacking in merit — a decision that would not have changed even had the President been truthful with respect to his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky — and that plaintiff was made whole, having settled this case for an amount in excess of that prayed for in her complaint.

Nevertheless, the President's contumacious conduct in this case, coming as it did from a member of the bar and the chief law enforcement officer of this Nation, was without justification and undermined the integrity of the judicial system. "[O]ur adversary system depends on a most jealous safeguarding of truth and candor," United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 1993), and "[t]he system can provide no harbor for clever devises to divert the search, mislead opposing counsel or the court, or cover up that which is necessary for justice in the end." Id. at 457-58. Sanctions must be imposed, not only to redress the misconduct of the President in this case, but to deter others who, having observed the President's televised address to the Nation in which his defiance of this Court's discovery Orders was revealed, might themselves consider emulating the President of the United States by willfully violating discovery orders of this and other courts, thereby engaging in conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial system. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (noting that "other parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery orders of other district courts" if contumacious conduct was left unaddressed) (per curiam); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (noting that Rule 37 sanctions must be applied diligently, both to penalize those whose conduct warrants sanctions and to deter those who might be tempted to sanctionable conduct in the absence of such a deterrent).

Accordingly, the Court imposes the following sanctions:

First, the President shall pay plaintiff any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders. Plaintiff's former counsel are directed to submit to this Court a detailed statement of any expenses and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this matter within twenty (20) days of the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Second, the President shall reimburse this Court its expenses in traveling to Washington, D.C. at his request to preside over his tainted deposition. The Court therefore will direct that the President deposit into the registry of this Court the sum of $1,202.00, the total expenses incurred by this Court in traveling to Washington, D.C.

In addition, the Court will refer this matter to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct for review and any disciplinary action it deems appropriate for the President's possible violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Relevant to this case, Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to, among other things, "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," or to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." The President's conduct as discussed previously arguably falls within the rubric of Rule 8.4 and involves matters that the Committee on Professional Conduct may deem appropriate for disciplinary action....

Mr. Clinton then entered into a voluntary agreement with the Arkansas Bar, under which his license to practice law in Arkansas was suspended for five years. He is eligible for reinstatement this month (Jan '08).

a. ;)

Tax-time lecture

I'm an attorney. I took 5 tax classes in law school (I'm still not exactly sure why...), and I've worked as a tax preparer for a major firm, as well as having tax clients in my law practice, so I've seen tax records in various states of preparedness. If you want to make it easier on yourself, do this:

1. Buy an 8"x11" spiral notebook with the perforated pages. Today.

2. Whenever you get a receipt that you even think *might* have something deductible on it, tape or staple it to its own page in the notebook, and write next to the receipt what you think the deductions are.

3. At tax time next year, tear out the pages with receipts on them, and take them all in to your tax preparer.

You'll have everything in one place, and they'll be able to sort identical-sized pieces of paper, instead of reciepts of varying sizes (which have a tendency to float off of desk tops, etc.). Once the taxes are done, the pages are also easier to file away than individual receipts are.

The other alternative is to do *everything* through your checkbook, and just mark potentially deductible items on your statements. The problem with that, though, is that sometimes you have more than one thing in the purchase amount; you go to the drugstore to pick up a deductible prescription, but you also buy soda and a book. If you have the receipt, you know the exact amount you paid that you can deduct. You can, of course, write the deductible amount in your check register, but what if you forget to do it right away?

Lecture concludes. Hope it helps!

a. ;)

Defamation Information

I hereby post, as a public service, the following facts regarding defamation (please note that "slander" and "libel" are both included in the wider term "defamation"). Feel free to disseminate this information at will; I ask only that you cite the sources that I have provided.

a. ;)


Defamation is a public communication that tends to injure the reputation of another. It includes both libel (written defamatory statements) and slander (oral ones). The definition of defamation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but “there is common agreement that a communication that is merely unflattering, annoying, irksome, or embarrassing, or that hurts only the plaintiff’s feelings, is not actionable.” Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander and Related Problems 2–9 (1999). People should be tough enough not to be injured by such statements, which would flood the courts if actionable. Id. at 2–10.

The U.S. Restatement (Second) of Torts defines defamation as a communication that “‘tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’” Id. at 2–11 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977)). England, birthplace of the common law, has a similar definition. One court framed the question as whether "‘what has been published . . . would tend in the minds of people of ordinary sense to bring the plaintiff into contempt, hatred, or ridicule or to injure his character.’” Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd, 1 All E.R. 1011, 1015 (H.L. 1993) (U.K.) (quoting South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v. North-Eastern News Association Ltd, 1 Q.B. 133, 138 (Q.B. 1894) (U.K.)).

Other common tests include:

“‘lowering the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking people generally,’ ‘injuring the plaintiff’s reputation by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule,’ and tending to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided.’” Geoffrey Robertson & Andrew G.L. Nicol, Media Law 46 (1992).

Elements shared by most jurisdictions include a statement, publication to a third party or parties, and a potential to injure the plaintiff’s reputation. . . . The questions for the court include: is the statement true, does it matter if it is true, how will readers interpret it, and what was the mens rea of the person who made it. . . . Once an action reaches trial, the common law has traditionally offered three defenses to defamation: truth, fair comment, and privilege. For a more detailed discussion of these defenses, see Robertson & Nicol, supra, at 70–95; see also Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 1010, 1015–17 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.).

Truth, or justification, is a complete defense for statements of fact. If defendants can prove the truth of a defamatory statement, they cannot be held liable for damages. Perfection is not required, however. In Britain, for example, the defendant only needs to show that the statement is “substantially correct.” See Robertson & Nicol, supra, at 73–76. The defense of fair comment offers protection for the expression of opinions. The court does not need to agree with the opinion; instead, it must determine “whether the views could honestly have been held by a fair-minded person on facts known at the time.” Id. at 79. . . . A true statement is never defamatory.

http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss13/docherty.shtml

Defamation refers to false statements of fact that harm another's reputation. It encompasses both libel and slander. Libel generally refers to written defamation, while slander refers to oral defamation. . . . The hallmark of a defamation claim is reputational harm.

Basic requirements of a defamation case:

A defamation plaintiff must usually establish the following elements to recover:

• Identification: The plaintiff must show that the publication was "of and concerning" himself or herself.

• Publication: The plaintiff must show that the defamatory statements were disseminated to a third party.

• Defamatory meaning: The plaintiff must establish that the statements in question were defamatory. For example, the language must do more than simply annoy a person or hurt a person's feelings.

• Falsity: The statements must be false; truth is a defense to a defamation claim. Generally, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof of establishing falsity.

• Statements of fact: The statements in question must be objectively verifiable as false statements of fact. In other words, the statements must be provable as false.

• Damages: The false and defamatory statements must cause actual injury or special damages.

Defenses and privileges

There are numerous defenses and privileges to a defamation claim. Many of these vary from state to state. Sometimes, a particular party has carte blanche to make certain statements even if they are false. This is called an absolute privilege. Other privileges can be established as long as certain conditions are met.

Some of the more common defenses and privileges include:

• Truth or substantial truth: Truth is generally a complete defense. Many jurisdictions have adopted the substantial-truth doctrine, which protects a defamation defendant as long as the "gist" of the story is true.

• Statements in judicial, legislative, and administrative proceedings: Defamatory statements made in these settings by participants are considered absolutely privileged. For example, a lawyer in a divorce case could not be sued for libel for comments he or she made during a court proceeding.

• Fair report or fair comment: This privilege varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Generally, it provides a measure of protection to a defendant who reports on the deliberations of a public body, such as a city council meeting.

• Libel-proof plaintiffs: This defense holds that some plaintiffs have such lousy reputations that essentially they are libel-proof. The theory is that one cannot harm someone's reputation when that person already has a damaged reputation.

• Rhetorical hyperbole: Some courts will hold that certain language in certain contexts (editorial/opinion column) is understood by the readers to be figurative language not to be interpreted literally.

• Retraction statutes: Nearly every state possesses a statute that allows a defamation defendant to retract, or take back, a libelous publication. Some of these statutes bar recovery, while others prevent the defendant from recovering so-called punitive damages.

http://www.freedomforum.org/packages/first/defamationandfirstamendment/index.htm

Please note that since "slander" is an oral communication, it is impossible to "slander" someone by writing something (or typing something) about them on the internet. That would be "libel", a defamatory written statement - assuming the other requirements of defamation are met. If the written statement is true, the statement is not defamatory at all, as truth is a complete defense to defamation, as the following cases attest.

From POSNER v. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY, (S.D.N.Y. 3-21-2007), Slip op., at 20:

. . . "Under New York law "it is `fundamental that truth is an absolute, unqualified defense to a civil defamation action,' and `substantial truth suffices to defeat a charge of libel.'" Weber v. Multimedia Entertainment, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 0682 (JGK), 2000 WL 526726, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2000) (quoting Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1986)).
From BRECKENRIDGE PHARMACEUTICAL v. METABOLITE LABORATORIES, (S.D.Fla. 1-24-2007), CASE NO. 04-80090-CIV-COHN. Slip op., at 6:

In Florida, "a communication is `defamatory' if it tends to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him or her in estimation of community or deter third persons from associating or dealing with the defamed party." LRX, Inc. v. Horizon Associates Joint Venture ex rel. Horizon-ANF, Inc., 842 So.2d 881, 885 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2003). However, truth is "a defense to defamation. . . . Id. at 886-887, quoting Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So.2d 170, 183 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2000).
From DENNISON v. MURRAY STATE UNIVERSITY, (W.D.Ky. 11-3-2006), Case No. 5:05CV-182-R. Slip op., at 21:

The elements of defamation in Kentucky are: (1) defamatory language; (2) about
the plaintiff; (3) which is published; and (4) which causes injury to reputation. Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky.Ct.App. 1981). In Kentucky, truth is a complete defense, thus a defendant able to prove the truth of the statement at issue cannot be held liable for defamation. Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 795-96 (Ky. 2004).
From LEONARDI v. FREEMAN, (S.D.Ohio 10-11-2006). Slip op., at 7-8:

. . .the elements of defamation, including libel and slander, in Ohio are the following: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen Oil Serv., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 591, 601 (1992). A defamatory statement is a false statement "causing injury to a person's reputation, or exposing him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting him adversely in his trade or business." Matalka v. Lagemann, 21 Ohio App.3d 134, 136 (1985). In order for the statement to be considered libel per se, the words used in the publication must have the tendency to injure the plaintiff in his trade or occupation. Wilson v. Harvey, 164 Ohio App. 3d 278, 286 (Ohio Ct.App. 2005). Libel per se is defined as actionable in itself, i.e. it is libel by the very meaning of the words used. Wilson v. Harvey, 164 Ohio App. 3d 278, 285-286 (Ohio Ct.App. 2005). Actual malice and damages are presumed in an action for libel per se and thus need not be proven. Id., citing McCartney v. Oblates of St. Francis deSales (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 345, 354, 609 N.E.2d 216. Plaintiff asserts that the alleged defamatory statement is false. Defendant asserts that it is not false, and that Defendant repeated and reported exactly what Plaintiff said. Although truth is a complete defense to a claim of defamation, this is a question of fact for a jury to determine.
From BAUMAN v. MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL, (S.D.N.Y. 9-29-2006). Slip op., at 25-26:

. . .Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims based on the purported falsity of these
assertions fail. See Weber v. Multimedia Entm't, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 0682 (JGK),
2000 WL 526726, *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2000) (finding truth an absolute defense to
defamation).
From MAPINFO CORPORATION v. SPATIAL RE-ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, (N.D.N.Y. 2006). Slip op., at 33:

Under New York law . . . it is `fundamental that truth is an absolute, unqualified defense to a civil defamation action.'" Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Commonwealth Motor Parts Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 355 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (1st Dep't 1974)). Further, "`substantial truth' suffices to defeat a charge of libel." Id. (citation omitted).