Clinton and Perjury

Was President Clinton convicted of perjury?

The answer to that question is: Unequivocally, NO, he was NOT. He was ACCUSED of having committed perjury, in the Articles of Impeachment. He was acquitted of all charges in the Articles in the Senate trial. Period.

However, Judge Susan Webber Wright, the judge in the Paula Jones case, did find Clinton guilty of civil contempt of court (not a crime) for having given a misleading answer in his deposition in that case. Civil contempt, NOT perjury. He was "sanctioned", not "fined". While this may seem to be picking at hairs to the non-legally inclined amongst us, it actually does make for a big difference in the legal system.

From the Court's decision (all emphasis mine):

What began as a civil lawsuit against the President of the United States for alleged sexual harassment eventually resulted in an impeachment trial of the President in the United States Senate on two Articles of Impeachment for his actions during the course of this lawsuit and a related criminal investigation being conducted by the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC"). The civil lawsuit was settled while on appeal from this Court's decision granting summary judgment to defendants and the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment. Those proceedings having concluded, the Court now addresses the issue of contempt on the part of the President first raised in footnote five of the Court's Memorandum and Order of September 1, 1998. See Jones v. Clinton, 12 F. Supp.2d 931, 938 n. 5 (E.D.Ark. 1998). For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby adjudges the President to be in contempt of court for his willful failure to obey this Court's
discovery Orders....

On November 13, 1998, while the impeachment proceedings were taking place in the House of Representatives, the plaintiff reached an out-of court settlement for $850,000.00 and withdrew her appeal of this Court's April 1st decision granting summary judgment to defendants. See Jones v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1998). Thereafter, on February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment....

On two separate occasions, this Court ruled in clear and reasonably specific terms that plaintiff was entitled to information regarding any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame state or federal employees. See December 11, 1997 Order, at 3; Pres. Depo. at 53-55, 66, 78. Notwithstanding these Orders, the record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the President responded to plaintiff's questions by giving false, misleading and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process. The President acknowledged as much in his public admission that he "misled people" because, among other things, the questions posed to him "were being asked in a politically inspired lawsuit, which has since been dismissed." ...

Certainly the President's aggravation with what he considered a "politically inspired lawsuit" may well have been justified, although the Court makes no findings in that regard. Even assuming that to be so, however, his recourse for the filing of an improper claim against him was to move for the imposition of sanctions against plaintiff. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 708-09, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (noting the availability of sanctions for litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment).

The President could, for example, have moved for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 if, as he intimated in his address to the Nation, he was convinced that plaintiff's lawsuit was presented for an improper purpose and included claims "based on `allegations and other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary support' or unlikely to prove well-grounded after reasonable investigation." Id. at 709 n. 42, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), (3)). The President never challenged the legitimacy of plaintiff's lawsuit by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 11, however, and it simply is not acceptable to employ deceptions and falsehoods in an attempt to obstruct the judicial process, understandable as his aggravation with plaintiff's lawsuit may have been. "A lawsuit is not a contest in concealment, and the discovery process was established so that `either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.'" Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham[/i], 403 F.2d 119, 130 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)).

In sum, the record leaves no doubt that the President violated this Court's discovery Orders regarding disclosure of information deemed by this Court to be relevant to plaintiff's lawsuit. The Court therefore adjudges the President to be in civil contempt of court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)....

The Court now turns to the issue of appropriate sanctions. Several of the sanctions contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) are unavailable to this Court as the underlying lawsuit has been terminated. The Court cannot, for example, order that the matters upon which the President gave false statements be taken as established, nor can the Court render a default judgment against the President, both of which the Court would have considered had this Court's grant of summary judgment to defendants been reversed and remanded. Moreover, as the Court earlier noted, the determination of appropriate sanctions must take into account that this case was dismissed on summary judgment as lacking in merit — a decision that would not have changed even had the President been truthful with respect to his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky — and that plaintiff was made whole, having settled this case for an amount in excess of that prayed for in her complaint.

Nevertheless, the President's contumacious conduct in this case, coming as it did from a member of the bar and the chief law enforcement officer of this Nation, was without justification and undermined the integrity of the judicial system. "[O]ur adversary system depends on a most jealous safeguarding of truth and candor," United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 1993), and "[t]he system can provide no harbor for clever devises to divert the search, mislead opposing counsel or the court, or cover up that which is necessary for justice in the end." Id. at 457-58. Sanctions must be imposed, not only to redress the misconduct of the President in this case, but to deter others who, having observed the President's televised address to the Nation in which his defiance of this Court's discovery Orders was revealed, might themselves consider emulating the President of the United States by willfully violating discovery orders of this and other courts, thereby engaging in conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial system. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (noting that "other parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery orders of other district courts" if contumacious conduct was left unaddressed) (per curiam); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (noting that Rule 37 sanctions must be applied diligently, both to penalize those whose conduct warrants sanctions and to deter those who might be tempted to sanctionable conduct in the absence of such a deterrent).

Accordingly, the Court imposes the following sanctions:

First, the President shall pay plaintiff any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders. Plaintiff's former counsel are directed to submit to this Court a detailed statement of any expenses and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this matter within twenty (20) days of the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Second, the President shall reimburse this Court its expenses in traveling to Washington, D.C. at his request to preside over his tainted deposition. The Court therefore will direct that the President deposit into the registry of this Court the sum of $1,202.00, the total expenses incurred by this Court in traveling to Washington, D.C.

In addition, the Court will refer this matter to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct for review and any disciplinary action it deems appropriate for the President's possible violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Relevant to this case, Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to, among other things, "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," or to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." The President's conduct as discussed previously arguably falls within the rubric of Rule 8.4 and involves matters that the Committee on Professional Conduct may deem appropriate for disciplinary action....

Mr. Clinton then entered into a voluntary agreement with the Arkansas Bar, under which his license to practice law in Arkansas was suspended for five years. He is eligible for reinstatement this month (Jan '08).

a. ;)